

Requirements for SIP-based Peer-to-Peer Internet Telephony

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Overview

- P2P aka overlay network
- file sharing, VoIP, presence, instant messaging, content distribution, and collaboration
- resources of participants shared to provide services
 - computation, bandwidth, storage
- may use some limited centralized resources

Potential P2P Characteristics

- good scalability
 - self-scaling: resources increase with user population
- reduced management costs
 - “servers” are user-managed
- reduced deployment costs
 - low up-front investment
- easy setup
 - not exclusive to P2P

Terminology

- DHT (distributed hash table): key \diamond value mapping, kept on a set of hosts
 - incremental forwarding of queries to something closer to authoritative source of mapping
 - may be separate from actual computational or storage resource
 - could point to resource elsewhere
- Overlay network: collection of DHTs and their internal pointers (= query paths)
 - can be clients
 - subset of clients (“super nodes”)
 - special nodes operated by service provider

Basic goal

- **MUST** support basic voice, video, interactive text
- **SHOULD** support asynchronous messaging and presence

Resources to distribute


- Location service, NAT and firewall traversal servers, voicemail, address book, and configuration storage
- If possible, generic mechanism \diamond add more services later
- Note: SIP is already close to P2P
 - proxy servers not mandatory
 - proxy servers can be distributed
 - but lookup via DNS limits flexibility (domain only)

Protocol reuse

- Existing protocols such as SSL, TLS, and SIP SHOULD be reused as much as possible such that their usage does not introduce a significant overhead.

Not just one DHT

- accommodate different DHT algorithms:
 - Chord, CAN, Kademlia, Pastry, ...
 - still active research area
 - trade-off look-up costs vs. churn resilience
 - small vs. large scale
- client may be able to ignore DHT if external



NAT traversal

- The peer-to-peer system SHOULD distribute the functionality of NAT and firewall traversal servers to the end-points.
- A peer with NAT and firewall traversal capabilities SHOULD be selected such that it does not introduce significant delay between the communicating peers.

Voice transport

- The peers **SHOULD** support sending and receiving voice packets over TCP in addition to UDP.
 - Probably not really a P2P requirement.

Deployment scale

- The P2P system will be deployed in small offices and home networks (SOHO), emergency and ad-hoc situations, and globally over the Internet. The protocols **SHOULD** be flexible to cater for the varying scale requirements of these networks.

Architectural requirements

- SHOULD achieve Internet scale.
- MUST continue to function as peers arrive, depart, and fail. No assumptions on peer uptime or capabilities
 - may affect selection of DHT, however

Naming

- The system SHOULD allow centralized and non-centralized naming authorities.
 - support first-user-keeps naming
 - global naming may not be necessary in small, isolated overlays
 - may be able to qualify with p2p name

Services/resource lookup

- Some services may be centralized \diamond provide discovery
 - e.g., voicemail storage
- Interconnect with PSTN, non-P2P SIP, other P2P systems

Security issues

- Inherently different requirements and trust model
 - trust may be probabilistic \diamond similar to byzantine failure models
 - well-known results: 2/3 better be good
 - need to protect against “mole invasion”
 - but attacker may not be able to choose attacked node
 - different motivations of “evil nodes”:
 - leachers: don’t want to contribute resources
 - curiosity: steal information (but may only get random node)
 - DOS: prevent communications
- Identity
 - avoid identity theft \diamond typically, FCFS
 - sybil attacks (impersonation)

Security issues: signaling and media

- Media and signaling need to be encrypted end-to-end
 - discourage nosy peers
 - key exchange is hard problem (MIM)

Open issues

- Distinguish requirements for three models:
 - small-scale (zero-conf & “broadcast”)
 - built-in DHT
 - generic (external) DHT
- Characterizing security issues
 - traditional “provider is trusted” not always applicable